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Abstract 
 
Recent papers, discussing the impact of economic reform in India, argue that the positive 
effect of reform is more significant in states, which are not ‘labor friendly’. Also labor 
market reforms seem to be a pre-condition for success of liberal policies as far as their 
impact on poverty is concerned. We argue that the exact mechanism behind such a link is 
yet to be clarified. We try to provide such a mechanism in terms of a general equilibrium 
model involving formal and informal workers. Our framework is capable of providing 
such a link and shows that there are occasions when such link is violated. 
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1. Introduction 
Economic reform and poverty in India has emerged as a topic of great interest 
among economists ever since India started liberalizing its economic policies in the early 
1990s.  High rates of GDP growth in the recent years have encouraged economists and 
policy analysts to explore whether such growth has contributed to the reduction in 
poverty across states.  Although rates of poverty in urban and rural areas have shown 
declining trends in general, the outcome varies considerably across states.  Topalova 
(2005), for example, argues that tariff reduction on importable commodities has not been 
effective in reducing the incidence and depth of poverty across districts in India with 
concentration of import-competing activities.  Using a specific factor model of trade the 
study shows that in the presence of limited factor mobility, trade liberalization caused to 
increase the extent of rural poverty in India.  In a similar vein (also considering product 
and labor market deregulations) and in connection with the effect of trade on poverty in 
India, Hasan, Mitra and Ural (2006) provide contradictory evidence showing that the 
impact of trade reform on poverty is actually more visible in states with relatively 
‘flexible’ labor market conditions.  Moreover, this is consistent with the position of 
Besley and Burgess (2004).  Flexible labor market characteristics, as exemplified and 
quantified by Besley and Burgess (2004) do however, have some exceptions.  According 
to their results, Maharastra and Gujarat despite being labor friendly in terms of the 
conditions set out in this paper have shown impressive improvements.   
The present study intends to trace the exact link between labor market flexibility 
and poverty in the presence of a huge informal labor market, as would be the case with 
most developing countries, including India.  Labor market rigidities usually lead to the 
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hiring of informal workers who are hired at a wage rate lower than the one prevailing in 
the formal sector.  More specifically, in India more than 90% of the workforce is 
absorbed in the informal segment if agriculture is included in the estimate.  On the other 
hand, in the presence of less aggressive labor unions pro-employer governments may 
help to reduce hiring and firing costs of the organized workers.  Hence, in those states 
more people are likely to find jobs in the formal sector.  Greater employment should 
consequently have a negative impact on poverty.  Here we confine ourselves only to the 
definition of income poverty, such that people are poor if they earn a low wage as is 
common among the informal sector workers in many poor countries.  The workers do not 
have to be necessarily unemployed in order to be considered poor; they may have a job 
and may still be living in stark poverty due to the prevalence of very low market 
determined wages.  It is also likely that a more employer friendly policy will lead to a rise 
in the informal wage since increased labor demand in the formal sector will subsequently 
draw from the pool of informal workers.  Thus, if informal workers are poor to start with, 
flexible labor market conditions should increase their wages and hence reduce poverty.  
Therefore, there are two distinct effects of labor market reforms on poverty, as reflected 
in rising wage in the informal segment and more employment in the formal sector.   
This is however, a fairly naive and incomplete argument.  The realities certainly 
demand consideration of more intricate relationships.  Suppose, we consider capital to be 
freely mobile between the formal and the informal sectors.  Then, as flexible labor market 
conditions increase return to capital in the formal sector, capital is drawn into the formal 
sector and away from the informal sector.  A pure supply side response will then be a cut 
back in the existing wage in the informal sector, hurting the left-out informal workers.  
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Moreover, if formal sector does not expand sufficiently despite increased inflow of 
capital, poverty must go up.  Therefore, depending on the degree of capital reallocation 
between the formal and the informal sector two countervailing possibilities can be 
distinctly captured through a competitive general equilibrium framework.    
In situations where capital faces a more restrictive mobility condition, stringent labor 
market regulations are harmful for informal workers since low employment in the formal 
segment leads to greater crowding into the informal sector lowering the wage rate.  
However, if capital could move freely, aggressive trade unions in the organized sector 
will cause to push capital away into the informal segment thereby raising the informal 
wage despite substantial absorption of workers.  Hence, the interest of the organized and 
unorganized workers will converge.  Thus whether labor market reforms help the 
informal workers depend on the behaviour of capital flows.   
The problems with some of the recent papers written on the impact of reform in 
India and its relationship with labor market flexibility are quite a few.  First, the exact 
theoretical or testable hypothesis regarding the relationship between labor market reform 
and poverty is not properly analyzed.  Second, in the presence of a vast informal labor 
market, the focus should have been much more on this segment rather than on the 
organized sector.  Third, it is evident from the various rounds of NSSO that real informal 
wage has increased substantially in all the states in the post-reform era with absolutely no 
revolutionary changes in labor market conditions anywhere. This fact has been hardly 
taken into account.  
However, in a recent paper Marjit and Kar (2007) show that the effect of trade 
reform on the real informal wage in various states in India is positive and such 
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improvement in the informal wage can be significantly explained by the accumulation of 
real fixed assets and gross value added in the so-called urban Non-Directory 
Manufacturing Enterprises (NDMEs, employing up to five workers, as per NSSO 
definitions).  Furthermore, they show by constructing a panel for the states and over the 
years (1984-85 to 2000-01 with five year intervals in the data series) that the incidence of 
urban poverty (BPL percentage) in a given period is negatively and significantly affected 
by a rise in the informal wage in the previous period.             
With this backdrop the present paper draws on the growing literature on informal 
labor market in the developing economies and builds up a model where product market 
reform and labor market are simultaneously implemented in a general equilibrium 
framework allowing for some degree of capital mobility.  In this set up product market 
reform and labor market reform have conflicting outcomes depending upon the degree of 
inter-sectoral capital mobility. 
The second section describes the working of the basic model drawn from Carruth 
and Oswald (1981), Agenor and Montiel (1996), Marjit (2003), Marjit and Maiti (2006) 
and Marjit, Kar and Beladi (2007).   It also discusses the impact of both types of reform 
and derives conditions under which both will improve the informal wage.  The informal 
wage in this paper is used as a proxy for poor people’s income and may be interpreted as 
the minimum requirement for being on the margin.  Any drop in wages would push the 
individuals below the poverty line.  Section 3 concludes.     
 
2. The Model 
We have a two sector economy producing X and Y with labor and capital.  X is 
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produced in the formal sector with workers paid a fixed wage w .  If workers do not find 
a job in the formal sector, they go the informal sector where everyone gets a job and 
earns a market determined wage w.  It is assumed that ww > .  Note that, w though 
exogenous in the framework, can be endogenously determined either through the action 
of an optimizing union (Carruth and Oswald, 1981), Dasgupta and Marjit (2006)1 or 
through a model of ‘effort observability’ as developed by Esfahani and Saleh-Isfahani 
(1989).  Agenor and Montiel (1996) make extensive use of this framework in analysing 
development policies in a macroeconomic context.  The fixity of w is assumed because 
the crucial focus of the analysis rests elsewhere as we shall describe and one can treat 
changes in w as changes in effective hiring cost.  Thus lowering of w is synonymous 
with more flexible labor market conditions. 
X and Y both are traded goods with prices exogenously determined in the rest-of-
the-world.  This is the case of a small open economy.  We shall discuss the implications 
of relaxing this assumption later.  However, the fixity of prices is an artefact to focus on 
the pure supply side responses.  One can provide a more profound justification behind 
such assumption.   
In a very interesting paper, Foster and Rosenzweig (2004) argue that whenever 
there has been a productivity increase in the Indian agriculture, the consequent higher 
rural wage has discouraged rural industrialization.  Thus the supply side effect could not 
be compensated by greater demand for local goods through the increased income effect.  
Therefore, the importance of supply side effect must not be ignored even if there might 
be some demand side repercussions. 
                                                 
1 See appendix for a brief derivation on endogenous wage formation in the presence of labor unions in the formal 
sector.    
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In our model, the production functions exhibit CRS and diminishing returns and 
the markets are competitive.  Capital is imperfectly mobile between the formal and the 
informal sectors.  Absolute immobility of capital at one end gives us the specific-factor 
model while the perfect mobility yields a 2×2 Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson framework. 
These are two special cases in our model. 
Competitive price conditions imply 
)1( tPraaw XKXLX +=+   (1) 
YKYLY PRawa =+   (2) 
aij s are input-output coefficients derived by factor price ratios ‘t’ denotes a measure of  
“protection”/artificial subsidy/protective regulation which protects market and effectively 
increases the price. Workers try to find a job in the high wage sector. The unsuccessful 
ones are absorbed in the informal sector. 
LYaXa LYLX =+     (3) 
Full employment of capital implies 
KKK YX =+    (4) 
XKX KXa =     (5) 
YKY KYa =     (6) 
However, Kx and Ky once allocated act as imperfect substitutes. In other words, there is a 
mobility cost.  
    0),( >′= f
R
rf
K
K
Y
X     (7) 
One can show that,     (7a) )ˆˆ(ˆˆ RrKK YX −=− μ
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Where ‘ ٨’ denotes proportional change and ),0[ ∞∈μ  denotes the mobility 
elasticity with 0=μ , it is a standard specific factor model. With ∞→μ , we have perfect 
mobility of capital. 
(3), (4), (5) and (6) can be combined as, 
( ) LK
a
aKK
a
a
Y
KY
LY
Y
KX
LX =+− .   (8) 
Given  and )1( tP X + w , (1) determines r. Hence, 
LY
LX
a
a  gets determined. Then (2), 
(7) and (8) determine w, R , Ky.
In this framework, product market reform implies a decline in t and labor market reform 
is synonymous with a decline in w .  
From equations (1) and (2) it is perfectly possible to pre-empt the isolated 
implications of product market reform and labor market reform in the economy.  We 
would nevertheless derive a general condition in the appendix in order to emphasize on 
the potential impact of a simultaneous occurrence of both, which also leads to proposition 
I we present below.  Intuitively, a product market reform only, i.e. a decline in t, with full 
mobility of capital should indicate a decline in the sectoral rates of return to capital and 
hence an improvement in the wage received by the workers in the informal sector.  On 
the other hand, a labor market reform, where the workers in the formal sector now suffer 
due to a fall in the negotiated wage, would cause to draw in capital from the other sector 
given the initial differential in the rates and subsequently lower the return to the informal 
workers as well.  The argument may be summarized as the following claim.   
 
 
 
 9
Claim I: 
a. Perfect mobility of capital implies that the labor market reform hurts the informal 
workers while the product market reform is beneficial for them. 
b. Immobility of capital implies exactly the opposite of (a) 
 
When both the product market reform and the labor market reform are undertaken 
simultaneously the implications are countervailing and therefore an improvement in the 
informal wage is only conditionally feasible.  And yet, there is a possible case that both 
can lead to beneficial impact on the informal wage (see appendix for proof).   
 
Proposition I:  ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛∈∃
CB
A
CB
A
2
1
1
1 ,, μμ  such that both types of  
 
   reform undertaken simultaneously will improve w. 
 
Proof: A fall in both t and w increase the informal wage under ‘some’ capital mobility if 
and only if, the income-share of labor used in the production of commodity X is positive 
and less than 1.  Since this is always true except for the special case where X is produced 
by labor only, which is not relevant here, there always exists a possibility of wage gain 
for the informal workers (detailed proof in appendix).        
Proposition I implies that although the success of both types of reform depends on 
the extent of capital movement and in a way conflicting in nature, there are certain 
degrees of capital mobility as defined in the above range, when the positive impact of 
tariff reduction outweighs the negative impact of labor market reform.  This is not a 
trivial result since this is tantamount to identifying the critical degree, or at least the 
critical zone of capital mobility that can ensure a rise in informal wage despite presence 
of labor market reforms.  This zone may certainly be treated as important information 
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when considering capital mobility as a policy variable for improving the conditions of the 
poor informal workers is a target.   
Aggressive labor  
Aggressive labor force may negotiate a higher formal wage compared to a more 
submissive labor force. Another way of characterizing labor aggressiveness should be as 
follows. No matter whether it is the formal or the informal sector, a region is said to be 
more aggressive if perceived labor cost is higher than in another region with the 
same ( ww, ) . This is justified by the observation that it might be more expensive to 
maintain the same level of productivity in two regions. Relatively aggressive workforce 
might imply bad work culture, loss of actual time of work etc. Even though for the 
organized workforce it may not get reflected in the nationally negotiated wage rate, it will 
be reflected in the local informal wage rate. We capture this effect by a factor 
1>α attached to the labor coefficient in the competitive price conditions. What we show 
next is that the Besley and Burgess (2004) proposition is an outcome of our general 
equilibrium framework.   
Once we use the wider interpretation of the phenomenon of labor aggression, the 
competitive price conditions change to 
( )tPraaw XKXLX +=+ 1α    (9) 
YKYLY Praaw =+α    (10) 
With 1>α  implying more aggressive labor force.   
Differentiating we get, 
αθθθ ˆˆˆ LYKYLY rw −−=  
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αθθ
αθθ ˆˆˆ LY
KX
LX
KY
T −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−=  
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+−= LY
KX
LXKY
KY
KY T θθ
θθαθ
θ ˆˆ     (11) 
Note that even if we do not bring in the policy reform into the picture, greater value of 
α will reduce informal wage if X is relatively capital intensive, a reasonable assumption 
we suppose. More aggressive labor will affect the informal workers because the effect of 
a unit cost increase will be felt more on a sector which uses greater amount of labor per 
unit. For the same reason the positive effect of trade reform on w, a drop in T, will be 
dampened. 
 
 3.  Concluding Remarks 
 
Product market and labor market reforms should have different impact on 
informal wage, a benchmark of poor people’s income in a developing country. The role 
of capital mobility becomes quite crucial in the context. While more flexible capital 
movement between the formal and informal segments helps in improving the informal 
wage in the context of product market reform, the same may hurt informal workers when 
hiring (or firing) costs go down in the formal sector. This implies that labor-friendly 
states will have high informal wage when capital does not move much. This in turn 
implies that a labor friendly state will do better when capital does move a lot.  Movement 
of capital can itself be a time dependent phenomenon. We propose to examine the 
theoretical outcomes with the help of the data available through the NSS. Our earlier 
empirical analysis strongly suggests that the capital formation in informal sector pushes 
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up the informal wage and the rise of wage has significant negative impact on urban 
poverty between 1989 and 2000.  
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Appendix 
 
Endogenous determination of w  
 
The labor union is concerned only with the wage setting in the formal sector, i.e. sector X, 
given the sectoral stock of capital (we will derive two variations – one with the sector-
specific capital and the other with fully mobile capital).   
The Union’s utility function is given by: 
))(,( wLwUU X=     (A.1) 
where, XX
KX
LX
LXX Kr
wK
a
aXaL )(φ===  
X
X
K
wPf
w )
),(
(φ=     (A.2) 
since from competitive price conditions in equation (1), r is determined by ),( wPX .   
Now, given XK , it is easy to show from (A.2) that 0,0 <′< φδ
δ as
w
LX .   
From (A.1),    00 =+⇒=
w
L
L
U
w
U
w
U X
X δ
δ
δ
δ
δ
δ
δ
δ        (A.3) 
Let us assume sufficient restrictions on U, such that, 02
2
<
w
U
δ
δ .  From (A.3), consider an  
equilibrium value of formal wage solving the relation: *w    
We have now set the framework for capturing the labor market reforms.  Consider a 
slight modification of equations (A.1) and (A.2), as follows, 
))(,( γγ wLwUU X=       (A.1.1) 
and   X
X
X KwPf
wL )
),(
( γ
γφ=               (A.2.1) 
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where, 
sregulationLaborAnti
sregulationlaboro
−⇒<
−⇒>
1
Pr1
γ
γ
 
It also implies that any rise inγ would be a move towards pro-labor regulations and vice 
versa.   Given ),,( XX PKγ and with some restrictions on the functions, 
(.)(.)(.), fandU φ  we can derive,  
),,(* XX PKw γϕ=       (A.3) 
We reinstate this optimal value of *w in equation (A.3) and differentiate totally with 
respect toγ , such that the relationship between union-determined wage rate and the  
labor market reform turns out to be negative, i.e., 0* <γd
wd .    
Thus, any percentage change in the formal wage as determined by union bargaining can 
be explicitly written as a linear combination of the percentage change in the arguments:  
XX KPw
ˆˆˆ*ˆ 321 ααγα ++−= ,          3,2,1,0 => iiα        (A.4) 
Now using equations (1) and (2), we can re-write the equations of change (with fixed 
commodity prices) as: 
LXKXLX rw θγθθ ˆˆˆ −=+     (A.5) 
and      (A.6) 0ˆˆ =+ KYLY Rw θθ
Using (A.5) and (A.6),  0ˆˆ)1( 1 =++− KXLX rθθγα  
 Here, as long as, 0)1( 1 >+−α , a rise in γˆ  will lead to a fall in rˆ , and the rest of the 
results hold.  In other words, a move towards pro-poor labor regulations would 
unambiguously reduce the return to capital accruing to that sector.  The result would be 
indifferent even if capital were fully mobile between the two sectors earning the same 
return in both places.  The added implication would have been a rise in the unorganized 
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wage as well due to a pro-labor market reform.  In fact, we have argued in the main text 
that places where the reform is labor friendly in nature, the informal sector can register an 
increase in wages with palpable impact on the level of poverty, provided capital is 
relatively free to move.        
General Condition for Claim I: 
We are interested in the impact of a decline in t and w  on w, the informal wage. We have 
to solve for  as a function of wˆ wˆ  and ( ) Tt ˆˆ1 =+ . We follow Jones (1971) and Marjit and 
Kar (2007) closely to derive the following, by differentiating equations (8) and using 
(7a). 
)ˆˆ)(()ˆˆ( RrTw
KX
KY
LXLYKX
KX
X
LX −−−−− λ
λλλμλσ
σλ  (A.7) 
Whereλ s are allocation shares of labor and capital in each sector, σ s are elasticity of 
factor substitution and θ s are the cost-shares. Substituting for etc. by 
differentiating competitive price equations we get, 
Rr ˆ,ˆ
[ ] [ ]
CDD
CBAw
CDD
CBATw
21
21
21
11 ˆˆˆ μ
μ
μ
μ
−−
−+−−
+−=    (A.8) 
Where,  
KX
XLXA θ
σλ=1 , 
KX
KXB θ
λ=1 , 
KX
LXKXB θ
θλ=2 , 
KY
KYLY
LYC λ
λλλ −=  
KY
YLYD θ
σλ=1 , 
KY
LY
KYD θ
θλ=2  
(A.8) helps us in framing Claim I. 
 
Proof of Claim I (a): When αμ → , from (A.8) 
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2
2
2
1 ˆ.ˆˆ
D
B
w
D
B
Tw +−=  
Therefore, if and if 0ˆ >w 0ˆ <T 0ˆ <w 0ˆ <w  
Proof of (b): When 0→μ , from (A.8) 
1
1
1
.ˆ.ˆˆ
D
Aw
D
ATw −+=  
Therefore,   if   and if 0ˆ <w 0ˆ <T 0ˆ >w .0ˆ <w  QED
 
Proof of Proposition I: 
From (A.8) 
( ) ( )
CDD
ACBw
CDD
CBATw
21
12
21
11 ˆ
ˆ
ˆ μ
μ
μ
μ
+
−++
−=    (A.9) 
It is easy to check that  
0ˆ
ˆ <
T
w  iff CBA 11 μ<  and 0ˆ
ˆ <
w
w  iff 12 ACB <μ  
Therefore, for both types of reform to have a positive impact on w one must have, 
CB
A
CB
A
1
1
2
1 >  Or, 
12
11
BB
>  
Or,  which always holds as 12 BB < 10 << LXθ . 
         
